Abstract: In Savage [41] a 'behavioral foundation' was given for subjective probabilities, to be used in the maximization of expected utility. This paper analogously gives a behavioral foundation for fuzzy measures, to be used in the maximization of 'Choquet-expected utility'. This opens the way to empirical verification or falsification of fuzzy measures, and frees them of their 'ad hoc' character.
subjective probabilities, by means of 'coherence', and are more often quoted in artificial intelligence literature. Everything said in this paper concerning Savage [41] applies to these works as well. Wakker [54] (Section A2) argues that the work of de Finetti (this applies to the derived work of Lindley as well) implies a linearity of utility, in a way often neglected in literature; a quantitative nature of consequences is essentially needed. Linearity of utility (w.r.t. the quantitative nature of consequences) is mostly considered too strong a restriction in decision theory.
Next we give the definitions needed to sketch, roughly, the work of Savage [41] . By S = {Sl,..., sn} we denote a (for convenience finite) set ('space') of ('crisp') (possible) states (of nature) (in other contexts called 'possible worlds', 'elementary outcomes', 'elementary propositions', etc.). Exactly one state is the true state, the other states are untrue. For example one may think of a horse race that will take place, with n participating horses; sj is the 'state' that horse j will win. A person (intelligent system, robot, animal .... ), called decision maker,
does not have enough information to be certain which state is the true one, and has not any influence upon the truth of the states. Question is at this moment whether the knowledge of the decision maker can be modeled through a 'subjective' probability distribution P over S, with P(A) measuring the 'degree of belief' of the decision maker in the truth of A. A basic idea, and one of the great contributions, of Savage's set-up is the idea that a probability measure by itself has no meaning. Only when it can be related in some sense to (observable) behavior with consequences that matter, does it get meaning. The observable behavior of the decision maker is modeled in Savage's decision-theoretic approach as the choosing, in any situation, between the so-called 'acts' available to him (or her). The term 'act' may be somewhat misleading, the behavior of the decision maker only consists of choosing one of the available acts. The resulting consequence of a chosen act depends upon which state is the true one.
Formally, the set of all consequences that may in any situation result from any act is denoted by ~¢. For simplicity of exposition we assume that ~f = ~, designating amounts of money. In the appendix we shall show how the results can be generalized to more general consequence sets. So now we assume that a consequence is completely described through the resulting amount of money. An act f is just a function from S to ~, assigning to every state s the consequence f(s) which would result if s would be true and fwould have been chosen. ~: is U s, i.e., the set of all acts. Since the decision maker is uncertain about which state is true, he is uncertain about which consequence will result from a chosen act. For example if S describes a horse race, then 'acts' may consist of betting money on horses.
Formally the (dispositional) choice behavior of the decision maker is modeled through a binary relation (the preference relation) >~ over the set ~ of all acts. We write f >~ g if the decision maker thinks f is at least as good as g, i.e., is willing to choose f if f, g are available to him. In any situation (with a finite number of acts available) the decision maker will choose the available act which is optimal according to ~>. The choice behavior of the decision maker, modeled through ~>, is considered to be the observable primitive of the model. Essential for the meaning of subjective probabilities (or belief functions, fuzzy measures ..... etc., as well as utility functions) is their relation to the preference relation. Without that relation to the preference relation, the meaning of subjective probabilities etc. would be void. Note that in this set-up there is nothing fuzzy in the preferences. All fuzziness is modeled through the state space. The only vagueness (fuzziness, uncertainty,.., etc.) concerns the true state; the preference relation describes how to make decisions while facing this vagueness. Savage formulated a list of 'internal consistency' ('coherence') conditions for the preference relation, sufficient for the applicability of expected utility, i.e., sufficient for the existence of a probability measure P on S, and a 'utility function' U:C--->R, so that
We shall not repeat all the conditions of Savage [41] . Recent formulations have been provided in Fishburn [16] (Section 14), and Wakker [54] (Section A2), and on many other places. Let us only emphasize that all conditions are directly in terms of the preference relation, so that they have empirical meaning. The very idea of obtaining such a 'behavorial foundation' is one of the great achievements of Savage. Throughout this paper the behavioral foundations, given in statements numbered (ii) in theorems in the sequel, will also be directly in terms of conditions of the preference relation. Savage's conditions can be split into two categories, the intuitively meaningful conditions which are also necessary for expected utility maximization, and the ('continuity-like') technical ones which are not fully necessary for expected utility maximization. The technical conditions in Savage are rather intractable, and for instance turned out to imply boundedness of utility in a 'hidden' way. Hence, for as far as we know, no scientific analysis has actually taken the set-up of Savage as point of departure. The most usual approach builds upon Anscombe and Aumann [3] , and assumes that consequences consist of 'objective' probability distributions over 'prizes'. That induces a very convenient linear structure on the consequence space, and will also be the approach of this paper. In many contexts objective probabilities are not given, and other set-ups are required. This motivated the derivation of expected utility in Wakker [54] (Theorems IV.2.7 and V.6.1). There no objective probabilities are needed, and the only technical restriction left is continuity of utility. This is more tractable and suited for applications than Savage's technical conditions. The conditions for the preference relation are more complicated than those of Anscombe and Aumann [3] , and the proofs much more complicated. Also for the characterization of fuzzy measures as provided in this paper a derivation which does not use objective probabilities as a tool may be desirable. Such a derivation (using the term 'capacity' instead of fuzzy measure), again with continuity of utility as only restriction left, has been obtained in Wakker [53] and Wakker [54] (Theorem VI.5.1). Again, the involved conditions are more complicated, and the derivations are much more complicated. A derivation of fuzzy measures with technical restrictions analogous to those of Savage, has been provided in Gilboa [19] . 
Elementary definitions of our set-up
S, ~, and ~ are as in Savage's approach above. We assume that the consequence space ~ is the set ~ of money lotteries. I.e., an element P = (pl,Xl ..... Pro; Xm) from ~ is a probability distribution with finite support over R, resulting with probability p~ in the amount of money (real number) xl .... , and with probability Pm in the amount of money (real number) Xm. Of course, to any A c •, P assigns probability ~x,~APi-Money lotteries can be 'mixed', for 0 ~< a~ ~< 1, a~P 1 + (1 -a0P 2 assigns tYPI(A) + (1 -t~)p2(A) to each A c R. For any function U: R --> R, by EU we denote the function assigning to each money lottery the expectation of U ('expected utility', if U is 'utility') under the lottery, i.e., 
i=l An act f will result in the money lottery f(sj) where sj is the true state. Of course, next the probability mechanism of f(sj) will determine the amount of money received by the decision maker. Note that we do not assume any probability measure given on S. Acts can also be mixed, in a 'pointwise manner', as af
Like in Anscombe and Aumann [3] and Schmeidler [42] , in our analysis the stochastic mechanism determining which amount of money will result from a money lottery is not the central interest. Rather is it an auxiliary structure to facilitate the analysis. It makes possible the application of techniques for mixture spaces as started in the Appendix of von Neumann and Morgenstern [51] , and extensively used in Fishburn [17] , and many other recent works in decision theory. We shall assume that the stochastic mechanism is well-established, and does not induce any vagueness. For instance, it may be constructed by an unbiased lottery wheel. Hence we shall, like Anscombe and Aumann [3] and Schmeidler [42] , assume in the sequel that the decision maker uses expected utility to value money lotteries. Our central interest will be the way in which the decision maker processes the vagueness concerning the true state.
Let us give one more comment concerning Anscombe and Aumann [3] . They not only use probability distributions over consequences, but also over acts. However, they add a 'reversal of order' condition which entails that the only relevant aspect of a lottery over acts is the induced marginal lotteries (given any state) over consequences. Hence one may as well describe a lottery over acts by the induced marginal lotteries given states, leading to the set-up of this paper.
As usual, we write f > g if f ~ g and not g ~f, f < g if g ~f, f < g if g >f, and f =g iff ~>g and g ~>f. We call ~ a weak order if it is complete (f ~g or g ~ffor all f, g) and transitive, and ~ is trivial if f ~>g for all f, g. We identify money lotteries with constant acts, and write p1 ~ p2 iff ~g for the acts f constant P~ and g constant p2; analogous notations are used with >, ~<, <, -. This induces preference relations over money lotteries. A function tp: ~---> R represents ~ if, for all acts f, g,
We call >> (mixture-)continuous if, for all f > g > h, there exist positive o~ and fl so ('close to 0') that (1 - One of the most difficult steps in finding a behavioral foundation for fuzzy measures is to find a sensible way to integrate with respect to these (in general) nonadditive functions. In the context of (subclasses, usually 't-conorms', of) fuzzy measures, several functionals have been studied in the literature, and proposed as 'integrals'; see for instance Weber [56, 57] , Smirez Garcia and Gil ,Advarez [47] , Sugeno and Murofushi [49] , and Hua [25] . The most well-known functional is the integral of Sugeno [48] . It is not linear (see Klement and Ralescu [30] ) and for probability measures does not coincide with the usual integral. Sugeno did obtain, for probability measures, an upper bound for the difference between his integral and the usual integral; Murofushi and Sugeno [36] (Proposition A2.1) extend this. We follow the way of integration of Schmeidler [42] , which later turned out to have been found already by Choquet [7] . Also H6hle [24] found this way of integration for fuzzy measures as did Quiggin [40] for the context of decision making under risk with given probabilities. We prefer this 'Choquet integral' because it is an extension of the usual integral for probability measures, is defined for any fuzzy measure, and is characterized by natural 'integral-like' additivity conditions in Anger [2] (Theorem 3) and Schmeidler [43] . Also Murofushi and Sugeno [36] observed these advantages. The applicability of the Choquet integral to fuzzy measures has been noted in H6hle [24] (his form is essentially equivalent to the Choquet integral), Weber [56] , Sugeno and Murofushi [50] , and Murofushi and Sugeno [36] . The usefulness for fuzzy measures of the decision-theoretic approach to Choquet integration has been noted in Wakker [52] (Example 7.8 and p. 21 lines 12-16). The present paper has grown out of an elaboration of the latter, and was announced in Wakker [55] .
For a fuzzy measure v, and a function ~:S---> R, the Choquet integral of q~ (with respect to v), denoted fs q~ dr, or S ~b do, is 
. n}--~S be a bijection so that

EU(f(~t(1))) >I EU(f(~(2))) >~. . . >I EU(f(~r(n))).
(2) I.e., :r orders states from most to least 'favorable', given function EUof. Define 
P'~({s}) := v({t e S: :r-'(t) <~ :r-l(s)}) -v({t e S: :r-'(t) < :r-'(s)}). (3)
So P=({s}) is the 'marginal fuzzy measure-contribution of s to the states more favorable than s'. This induces a probability measure P" on S. Now let f be an act, and EU: ~----> ~ a function. It can be seen (see Figue 1) that
From this one easily obtains, for any real )~,
Formula 4 is most suited for applications and intuition, since the numbers P'~({si}) can be interpreted as 'act-dependent' (through z 0 probabilities. The next formula (see again Figure 1 ) is most suited for mathematical derivations, and will be used in Section 5. We write EU(f(zc(n + 1))) := 0.
Independence in the presence of hedging, and main theorems
Savage [41] (p. 68) wrote: "... the.., view sponsored here does not leave room for optimism or pessimism.., to play any role in the person's judgement of probabilities". Fuzzy measures generalize Savage's expected utility approach by leaving such room for optimism or pessimism phenomena. Let us elucidate this through formula (4) . The probabilities Pn({si} ) (interpreting the marginal fuzzy-measure contributions as such) may now depend on the act f through the way in which f (viz. :r in (4)) orders the states from most to least favorable (this interpretation has been introduced in Wakker [52] ). A pessimistic decision maker now has the possibility to assign larger probabilities to states when they are unfavorable, than when they are favorable. Because of this, a pessimistic decision maker appreciates 'hedging' against vagueness as in the following example. A pessimistic decision maker will dislike the vagueness about the states. If he chooses act g he will give most weight to the unfavorable state s2, if he chooses act h he will give most weight to the unfavorable state sl. Act f does not involve any vagueness and will be preferred both to g and h. The effect of concern to us is the 'hedging' involved in mixing g and h. In the mixture (f=)~g + ½h, the favorable outcome of g given Sl gives a hedge against the unfavorable outcome of h given s~, and the favorable outcome of h given s2 gives a hedge against the unfavorable outcome of g given s2. In this extreme case a complete hedge against vagueness occurs. Appreciation of the hedging can be modeled by Choquetexpected utility, by setting 3.:= LI({S1}) : Lf({S2}) • 1 Then both for g and h the most favorable state gets assigned, according to Formula (3), marginal fuzzymeasure contribution A, the least favorable state gets assigned the higher marginal fuzzy-measure contribution 1 -A.
For the sequel it is useful to note that, whereas f > g, mixing each act with ½h is strictly more favorable than s4, whereas for g it is reversed, s4 is strictly more favorable than sl.
Middle: f and g are comonotonic. For each act state s2 is at least as favorable as s4, s4 is at least as favorable as s~, s 1 is at least as favorable as s 3. fand g are not maxmin-related, for state s 1 (as well as s4) each act is neither maximal, nor minimal. Right: Extreme case of comonotonicity: f and g are maxmin-related. To change the acts from the middle figure to obtain maxmin-relatedness, EU-values had to be 'driven to the extreme' (old values indicated by dashed lines). In s~ the EU-value off was lowered to the minimal EU-value off, in s 4 the EU-value of g was increased to the maximal EU-value of g. Now in s I and s 3 act f has its minimal EU-values, in s 2 and s 4 act g has its maximal EU-value. This shows that two acts are comonotonic if and only if the favorability ordering of states, described by ~r, can be taken the same for the involved acts. A set of acts is comonotonic if every pair of acts in the set is comonotonic. As shown in Wakker [54] (Lemma VI.3.3) then a ~r as above can be obtained applying simultaneously to all acts in the set. In other words, on a comonotonic set the 'act-dependent' probabilities P~ in (4) can be taken constant, and the Choquet integral behaves as a usual additive integral with respect to a usual additive probability measure. Dellacherie [10] was the first to see this role of comonotonicity for nonaddive measures and the Choquet integral. The additive character of the Choquet integral was independently observed in Schmeidler [42, 43] and Murofushi and Sugeno [36] ; the rank-ordering of outcomes as in Section 3, line 4 in the latter reflects comonotonicity.
The following condition was used in Anscombe and Aumann [3] to characterize expected utility in the present set-up, with money lotteries as consequences.
Definition 3 (see Figure 3) . We say ~ satisfies independence if, for all acts {f, g, h }, and 0 < a~ < 1,
The idea is that, if in a mixture of acts, one 'ingredient' (g above) is replaced by a better 'ingredient' (f above), then the mixture should improve by that. The condition does not reckon with attitudes towards hedging, and then, as in Example 1, is not appropriate if there is vagueness inducing hedging. Independence is the natural analogue of Savage's famous 'sure-thing principle'; about that principle analogous intuitive comments can be made.
The term cardinal, used in the following theorems, in this paper is no more than a convenient abbreviation of 'unique up to a positive affine transformation'. A transformation is positive affine if it multiplies with a positive real number and/or adds up a real number. Section 5 proves Theorem 11, and derives Theorems 4 and 6 as corollaries. One justification argues that if in a mixture of g and h the ingredient g is replaced by the 'better' ingredient f, then the mixture as a whole should become better by that.
Another justification argues as follows. The preference 1 should imply the preference 2, the involved choice situations being identical. The preference 2 should imply the preference 3, the involved choice situations being 'strategically' equivalent.
Comonotonic independence requireg the implication of preference 3 by preference 1 only if all involved acts are comonotonic, maxmin-independence requires the implication only if all involved acts are maxmin-related. The idea is that, because of vagueness, the mixing of acts may induce 'disturbing' hedging effects. Hence, only if hedging effects are excluded by comonotonicity or maxminrelatedness, the implication is required.
So independence, in the presence of the other conditions, leads to the usual 'probabilized' expected utility, where no vagueness about the states is incorporated. In the presence of hedging-attitudes, the implication in independence is natural only when there is no 'disturbing' hedging effect in the involved mixings. This leads to the following definition, introduced in Schmeidler [42] , and weaker than independence.
Definition 5 (see Figure 3) . We say ~ satisfies comonotonic independence if, for all comonotonic {f, g, h }, and 0 < tr < 1,
f > g ~ af + (1-o~)h > o~g + (1-o~)h.
Schmeidler [42] proved, for the context of decision theory with 'nonadditive probabilities' instead of fuzzy measures, the following result. He indicated an extension of the result to infinite state spaces and 'bounded' acts (i.e., EUof is bounded).
Theorem 6 (Schmeidler). Let ~ be the set of money lotteries, S a finite set of states, ~ the set of functions from S to ~ (acts), and >~ a nontrivial preference relation over ~. The following two statements are equivalent: (i) There exist a fuzzy measure v on S, and a function U:~---> R, so that f ~ Ss EU of dv represents >~.
(ii) The preference relation >~ is a weakly monotonic mixture-continuous weak order, satisfying comonotonic independence.
Further, v in (i) is uniquely determined, and U is cardinal.
An extreme case of comonotonicity is the case where one act, say f, is constant. Then no optimism or pessimism is involved in the valuation of f, so, as one easily sees:
Lemma 7. Every act g is comonotonic with every constant act f. []
Restricting 'comonotonicity' in Definition 5 to the extreme case where one act (say h) is constant, leads to a condition too weak for our purposes. The following, somewhat less extreme, case will however suffice, Note that the following definition is symmetric in f and g.
Definition 8. Acts f and g are maxmin-related if either for every state s: [Vt e S:f(s) ~f(t)] or [Vt e S: g(s) ~<g(t)], or for every state s: [Vte S: g(s) ~g(t)] or [Vt e S:f(s) ~f(t)].
So one of the acts should be the 'max-act' (f in the 'either-case' above, g in the 'or-case'), the other the 'min-act' (g in the 'either-case' above, f in the 'or-case'), so that: For every state: Either the max-act assigns its maximal value, or the min-act assigns its minimal value. This explains the term. It should not appeal to max-min-like optimization techniques. Finally, a set of acts is maxmin-related if every pair of different acts in it is maxmin-related. (Note that an act f usually is not maxmin-related with itself!) Note that for maxmin-related acts f, g never simultaneously f(s) >f(t) and g(s) <g(t): Given these preferences, state s excludes the possibility that f were the min-act and g the max-act, state t excludes the possibility that f where the max-act and g the min-act. So maxmin-related acts are comonotonic:
Lemma 9. A maxmin-related set is comonotonic. []
The following definition replaces 'comonotonic' in Definition 5 by 'maxminrelated', thus leads to a definition which in general is weaker than comonotonic independence. We shall however see that in the presence of some other conditions maxmin-independence becomes equivalent to comonotonic independence. (Compare statement (ii) in Theorem 6 and statement (ii) in Theorem 11; each is equivalent to the same statement (i).)
P. Wakker
Definition 10 (see Figure 3) . We say ~ satisfies maxmin-independence if, for all maxmin-related {f, g, h }, and 0 < cr < 1,
The following theorem strengthens the theorem of Schmeidler [42] . Recall that the notation EU has been introduced in (1).
Theorem U. Let ~ be the set of money lotteries, S a finite set of states, ~; the set of functions from S to ~ (acts), and ~ a nontrivial preference relation over J;. The following two statements are equivalent: (i) There exist a fuzzy measure v on S, and a function U:ff~---> ~, so that f ~ fs EU of dv represents ~.
(
ii) The preference relation ~ is a weakly monotonic mixture-continuous weak order, satisfying maxmin-independence. Further, v in (i) is uniquely determined, and U is cardinal.
In the present context, where lotteries are for money, it is very natural that the function U in (i) in the theorems above is increasing; this can be obtained by adding in (ii) everywhere the requirement that tr ~> fl ¢~ tr I>/3 for any degenerate lotteries te (= (1; or)) and/3 (= (1;/3)); or, equivalently, by adding an assumption of '(strict) stochastic dominance'.
For the proof of the above theorem, given in Section 5, we could have closely followed Schmeidler [42, 43] . His proof can straightforwardly be adapted to our case of maxmin-relatedness. His proof is however not easily available. It is split into two parts. In Schmeidler [42] it is proved that a functional, analogous to CU below, satisfies a list of conditions. Next Schmeidler [43] is used to show in general that functionals satisfying the involved conditions are a Choquet integral. We take the opportunity to give an alternative presentation, with a 'one-stage all-in proof', without requiring knowledge of functional analysis, as Schmeidler's proof does. Our proof uses ideas of Theorem 3 in Anger [2] , who already, in a slightly different context, obtained the result of Schmeidler [43] with comonotonic independence weakened to 'weak additivity', an analogue to maxmin-relatedness. Also the 'strong uncertainty aversion' axiom in Chateauneuf [6] was inspiring.
Proof of theorems
Proof of Theorem 11
First suppose (i) holds. All conditions apart from maxmin-independence are well-known and straightforward. We shall derive, stronger than maxminindependence, comonotonic independence. So let {jr, g, h} be comonotonic. By Wakker [54] (Lemma VI.3.3) we can take ~ so that, for all f'~ {f, g, h}, f'(:r(1)) ~f'(:r(2))~.--~f'(~(n)). It is straightforward from (i) that this also holds for every mixture of f, g, h. So we can write, according to (4) (noting that EU represents ~ on the constant acts, so that the :t in (2) can be chosen the same as the :r above), f EUof' dv = ET=I e~({si})EU(f'(si)), for any mixture f' of f, g, h. Consequently
both for f' =f, and f'= g. From this and the fact that Choquet-expected utility represents ~, comonotonic independence follows, hence also maxminindependence.
Next we suppose that (ii) holds, and derive (i) and the uniqueness result at the end of the theorem. Since all constant acts are mutually maxmin-related, restricted to the set of constant acts satisfies 'usual' independence; further it is a mixture-continuous weak order. Hence (see e.g. Fishburn [17] (Theorem 2.1)) there exists a cardinal function U : R ~ ~ so that on the set of constant acts P, is represented by P ~ EU (P) .
Note that the function U, mentioned in (i), has to be like the U just defined; hence U now has been obtained (up to a positive affine transformation). The following lemma derives 'certainty equivalents'. Because the mixture set generated by one act together with all constant acts usually is not maxmin-related, the proof is less simple than in Schmeidler's case of comonotonic independence.
Lemma 12. For every act f there exists a constant act Pf so that f -=-PY.
Proof. Let k, l be so that f(s~)~f(st)~f(sl) for all l~<i~<n. By weak monotonicity, f(Sk)~f ~f(st). Suppose the preferences are strict (otherwise we are done immediately). Mixture-continuity implies that (within EU(~)) the set of EU-values of the constant acts strictly preferred to f is open, as well as the set of EU-values of the constant acts to which f is strictly preferred. Since each of these open sets is nonempty, by convex-rangedness of EU, there must be a constant act Pf equivalent to f. [] Since all possible choices of Pf above are equivalent and have the same EU-value, we can define CU:f ~-* EU(PI). Obviously CU represents ~; this will often be used without further mention. Further CU is identical to EU on the constant acts.
The remainder of this proof will be devoted to the demonstration that CU is Choquet-expected utility, with capacity v uniquely determined.
Firstly, a preparatory lemma establishes a kind of 'maxmin-additivity' of CU (and implies the condition of maxmin-independence with equivalences instead of strict preferences).
Proof. Let phi__ h for all acts h. We may assume 0 < o~ < 1. It suffices to show that af + (1 -aOg -~ o~P I + (1 -oOg, because we can repeat this result to establish equivalence with a~P I + (1 -oOP g. We shall only establish af + (1 -er)g ~ erP I + (1 -cQg,
since all following preferences (and minimal/maximal) can be reversed. If pI is minimal (pI > Q for no Q) then, since EU represents ~ on constant acts, the right-hand act in (7) assigns to every state a money lottery not better than the left-hand act. By weak monotonicity (7) follows. So let there be a money lottery Q so that pr > Q. To complete the proof, we suppose that af + (1-a0g < a~P I + (1-a)g and derive contradiction. Since Q <f, by maxmin-independence we may add a~Q + (1 -c~)g < af + (1 -er)g < a~P I + (1 -cQg.
By mixture-continuity there should be a mixture with nonzero weights of the left and right acts strictly preferred to the middle act. We are done if we show that the middle act is preferred to any such mixture. For any fl > 0, f > flQ + (1- fl)Pf, so that by maxmin-independence err + (1 -tr)g > tr(flQ
Secondly, we obtain the fuzzy measure v. By weak monotonicity and nontriviality we can fix some arbitrary money lotteries pl> p0. Throughout this proof we use, for any P e ~ and A c S, the following notation:
(pOmp) is the act assigning P to A, and p0 to A ¢.
Now, given U, if indeed CU is Choquet-expected utility, then the involved fuzzy measure v is straightforwardly seen to be uniquely determined as
v :A ~ [CU((P°_AP1)) -EU(P°)]/[EU(P ~) -EU(P°)].
While we have not yet established that CU is Choquet-expected utility, we can nevertheless see that the expression in (9) is invariant under application of a positive affine transformation on U, so that indeed v is independent of the particular choice of ('scale' and 'location' of) the cardinal U. Hence we define v as in (9), and have v is well defined and uniquely determined.
Mainly by weak monotonicity v is seen to be a fuzzy measure indeed. For simplicity of notation we normalize U so that
EU(P °) --O, EU(P 1) = 1.
This gives the simpler v :A ~ CU((P°_AP1)). (11) Thirdly, we show: Proof (see Figure 4) . We rewrite (6), with :t(j) = sj for all j, and with the order of terms reversed, as:
The proof will use induction in a way that shows how the Choquet integral is 'built up layer after layer' by focusing during the induction step on the j-th term ('layer') of (13) (doubly dashed in Figure 4 So fJ assigns (at most)j different consequences. It follows directly that CU off 1 is Choquet-expected utility, fl being constant. Next we suppose (induction hypothesis), for some j > 1, that CU of fj-1 is Choquet-expected utility (i.e., it is equal to the first j -1 terms of (13) . We show that CU of fJ is Choquet-expected utility. By convex-rangedness of EU we can take P so that EU(P) = EU(f(s,_j+O) -EU(f(Sn_j+2)). By (12) (see Figure 4b 
gives first term
'graph' of p_ogs,, . . ., sn_j+l ))P Fig. 4b . A useful equivalence. The above mixtures (mixingp with PO, respectively mixingfj-' with a two-valued act), give equivalent acts, by formula (12) . Apply Lemma 13 to both mixtures, and interchange terms. It follows that the 'CU-difference' between the left-hand sides fj and fj-' is the same as between the right-hand sides, i.e., as the j-th term in formula (13) . This term has been doubly dashed in Figures 4a and 4b .
The second term in the difference in the left-hand side, by the induction hypothesis, is the Choquet-expected utility off j-l, i.e., equals the first j -1 terms in (13) . The right-hand side equals the j-th term in (13) . Hence the first term in the difference in the left-hand side equals the first j terms in (13), i.e., the Choquet-expected utility off j. By induction, for f =f", CU(f n) equals (13), i.e., the Choquet-expected utility of f. []
Fifthly and finally, we show for arbitrary f that CU(f) is the Choquet-expected utility of f, i.e., the Choquet integral of f o E U. Showing it for any f with f(s) ~ pO for all s is fully analogous to the above lemma, by a simple permutation of states. So we finally turn to acts f so that p0 is strictly preferred to some of the assigned money lotteries. Let for such an, arbitrary but now fixed, act f, p0, be a money lottery so that pO, <~f(sj) for each s t, e.g., p0, is the 'minimal' money lottery assigned by f. Define the 'location constant' lc by lc =-EU(P°'). Replace the cardinal U by U'=U+I~, resulting in EU'=EU+lc instead of EU, and CU'= CU+ 1~ instead of CU. We can repeat the above exposition with p0' instead of pO, and pV instead of p1 so that EU'(P v) = 1 = EU(P 1') + lc. The result is that CU'(g) is the Choquet integral of g o EU' for any g with g(s) >~ pO, for all s, w.r.t, a capactity v' (v' = v will be shown). The result is also, by (5) and the role of l~ above, that CU(g) is the Choquet integral, w.r.t, the capacity v', of g o EU for any g with g(s) ~ pO, for all s, so certainly for f (so that showing v = v' will complete the proof), and certainly for any g with g(s)~ pO for all s. The latter, together with (9), shows that v = v'.
Proof of Theorems 6 and 4
The implication (i)ff (ii) in Theorem 6 can be inferred from the beginning of Subsection 5.1. The implication (ii)ff(i) follows from Theorem 11, since comonotonic independence implies maxmin-independence. The implication (i) (ii) in Theorem 4 is straightforward. Finally, suppose (ii) there holds. This implies (ii) of Theorem 11, hence (i) there. Remains to be shown that the fuzzy measure v is additive. The result of Lemma 13 can now completely analogously be derived for all f, g. Applying it, for disjoint A, B, to the CU-values of the left-and right-hand side of !too oz~ ½pO _1oo oi 2~'-AUB" ) + = 1p°-ap1 + 2---Band using (11) , gives additivity of the fuzzy measure.
A behavioral foundation for Zadeh's possibility measures
In their full generality, fuzzy measures do not seem to be specified enough to be useful. This was argued for fuzzy set theory in Dubois and Prade [14] (above formula (15) ), and several other places. Because of this there is interest in specified forms of fuzzy measures.
Hence the results in Theorem 6 and its supplement Theorem 11 seem to be too general for direct applications. Still we hope these results will prove useful.
Because of their generality, they provide a convenient starting point for the derivation of more specified results. (A short survey of specified kinds of fuzzy measures and integrals is provided in Dubois and Prade [15] .) As an example we show how to obtain a behavioral foundation of 'possibility measures', introduced in Zadeh [63] . It is our hope ¢o find a behavioral foundation of the belief functions of Dempster and Sharer, building upon Theorem 11. []
The proof of the above lemma is obtained by substituting Choquet-expected utility, and is left to the reader. Let us next combine the above lemma, and Theorem 11, to formulate a behavioral foundation of possibility measures: (ii) The preference relation ~ is a weakly monotonic mixture-continuous weak order, satisfying maxmin-independence ; further for any subsets A, B of S, formula (14) holds.
The uniqueness results are as in Theorem 11. [] Note that (14) , the characterizing condition for possibility measures in the presence of the other conditions, reflects the intuitive idea of possibility measures that one of the subsets should be 'decisive', and that a kind of interaction between disjoint sets should be excluded. Zadeh [63] (formula (2.26)) defined two events A, B to be noninteractive if v(A tq B) = min{v(A), v(B)}. (Also the max-operation as applied to unions above is sometimes taken as noninteractiveness of events.) The following lemma shows how to characterize noninteractiveness. It is analogous to Lemma 17, and again the proof is left to the reader. []
Conclusion
Measures for valuing knowledge are usually judged by their intuitive appealingness, computational efficiency, inner coherence, and/or performance in some applications. For one kind of such measures, fuzzy measures, this paper has given another kind of criteria, criteria derived from the decision-theoretic appropriateness for implementing decisions. This has been based on a theorem introduced by Schmeidler [42] into decision theory, and a strengthening of that theorem. While the criteria seem to be too mild, i.e., fuzzy measures seem to be too general, to be useful in applications, the obtained results may be useful as a starting point for other results. One example of that has been given, by deriving a behavioral foundation of possibility measures.
Hopefully the results of this paper will help to value fuzzy measures and their many specified forms by more than ad hoc criteria.
Appendix: Mathematical generaliTxtions
To make the message of this paper as clear and accessible as possible, we have assumed that consequences are real numbers, designating amounts of money, or are money lotteries, and we have assumed that the state space is finite. In fact, the only mathematical structure of the consequence space ~ that we used was that this set is a 'mixture space' (see for instance Fishburn [17] (Section 2.1), Fishburn [18] (Definition 8.3), Wakker [54] (Definition VII.2.1), etc.). This applies for instance to any convex subset of a linear space, a special case of which is the case of any convex set of probability distributions, such as considered in Schmeidler [42] . The only property of EU that we used was that it is affine. Hence our results can for instance be applied to the case considered in Yaari [59] , Chateauneuf [6] and Denneberg [12] , with consequences (certain) amounts of money and utility linear.
If indeed ~ is a convex subset of a linear space, then the generalization of Theorem 6 to the case of continuous (instead of affine) utility, (even when ~ is any connected topological space) has been carried out in Wakker [53] and Wakker [54] (Chapter VI). The extension of these results to infinite state spaces has been given in Wakker [52] . All the references just mentioned have been formulated for the context of decision theory.
The following observation can be established by rereading the proof, and checking that nowhere we used more of maxmin-independence than the case described in the lemma. In particular Lemma 13 was needed only for twovalued g. 
